Deep Brain Stimulation, Authenticity and Value by Nyholm, Sven & O’Neill, Elizabeth
 Deep brain stimulation, authenticity and value: further
reflections
Citation for published version (APA):
Nyholm, S. R., & O'Neill, E. R. H. (2017). Deep brain stimulation, authenticity and value: further reflections.
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 26(4), 658-670. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180117000159
DOI:
10.1017/S0963180117000159
Document status and date:
Published: 22/09/2017
Document Version:
Accepted manuscript including changes made at the peer-review stage
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can be
important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record. People
interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication, or visit the
DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above, please
follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.tue.nl/taverne
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
openaccess@tue.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (2017),  0 , 1 – 13 .
 © Cambridge University Press 2017.
doi:10.1017/S0963180117000159 1
 Continuing the Conversation 
 Deep Brain Stimulation, Authenticity and Value 
 Further Reﬂ ections 
 SVEN  NYHOLM and  ELIZABETH  O’NEILL 
 Abstract:  In this article, we engage in dialogue with Jonathan Pugh, Hannah Maslen, and 
Julian Savulescu about how to best interpret the potential impacts of deep brain stimulation 
on the self. We consider whether ordinary peoples’ convictions about the true self should 
be interpreted in essentialist or existentialist ways. Like Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu, 
we argue that it is useful to understand the notion of the true self as having both essentialist 
and existentialist components. We also consider two ideas from existentialist philosophy—
Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir’s ideas about “bad faith” and “ambiguity”—to 
argue that there can be value to patients in regarding themselves as having a certain amount 
of freedom to choose what aspects of themselves should be considered representative of 
their true selves. Lastly, we consider the case of an anorexia nervosa patient who shifts 
between confl icting mind-sets. We argue that mind-sets in which it is easier for the patient 
and his or her family to share values can plausibly be considered to be more representative 
of the patient’s true self, if this promotes a well-functioning relationship between the patient 
and the family. However, we also argue that families are well advised to give patients room 
to determine what such shared values mean to them, as it can be alienating for patients if they 
feel that others try to impose values from the outside. 
 Keywords:  deep brain stimulation ;  authenticity ;  the true self ;  essentialism ;  existentialism ; 
 values ;  anorexia nervosa 
 When patients and their families express concerns about the impact that deep 
brain stimulation (DBS) can have on the self, are these concerns always primarily 
about psychological continuity over time, or are they sometimes concerns about 
something else? Moreover, should we take it for granted that DBS either has a bad 
effect on the self or else is neutral, having no effect on the self? In our previous 
article on this topic in the  Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , we argued that 
neuroethical discussions of DBS should be concerned not only with continuity 
over time, but also with the impact of DBS on what patients and their families 
think of as the patient’s “true self.” We also argued that sometimes, the effect of an 
intervention such as DBS is neither bad nor neutral with respect to the self; rather, it 
can also be positive, by helping to rehabilitate or make manifest the patient’s true 
self. In such cases, the patient can be understood as achieving greater “authenticity” 
with the help of DBS.  1  
 In their article in this issue, Jonathan Pugh, Hannah Maslen, and Julian Savulescu 
move the conversation on DBS and authenticity forward, partly by highlighting 
and discussing a number of issues that we did not comment on in our previous 
article.  2  We are delighted to have this opportunity to engage in a dialogue with 
them about how best to interpret and analyze the idea of authenticity and the true 
self in relation to its importance for DBS patients and their families. 
 Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu, address a number of theoretical points before 
returning to the sorts of practical cases that motivate the debate about DBS and 
authenticity. They emphasize a general distinction between “essentialist” and 
“existentialist” understandings of authenticity and the practical implications 
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of this distinction. They also discuss the question of what it is to value some-
thing. They do so because, like us, they think that people’s values are closely 
related to what they and others will perceive as representative of their true 
selves. 
 Here, we will follow their lead. We will fi rst discuss the essentialism/existentialism 
distinction as a way of deepening the analysis of peoples’ intuitions and beliefs 
about the authentic or true self. We will consider a certain type of unavoidable 
ambiguity at the heart of the human condition that this distinction suggests. Like 
them, we will also discuss the relation between peoples’ values and what they 
regard as their true selves. Most importantly, however, we will return to a practical 
case that Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu also discuss: namely, the type of case in 
which DBS patients (or other patients) are shifting between different mind-sets, 
and the question therefore arises if any of these mind-sets is more representative 
of the patient’s true self. 
 In particular, Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu focus on patients with anorexia 
nervosa (AN), because such patients are sometimes unstable in their mind-sets.  3  
Suppose that in one mind-set an AN patient believes that his or her condition is a 
health problem that should be treated. But the patient then sometimes shifts back 
to a mind-set in which he or she places a higher value on being extremely thin 
than on being “healthy” by common medical standards. Such cases raise two 
distinct and diffi cult types of questions. First, are there any general reasons for the 
patient or a third party to regard one mind-set as more representative of the per-
son’s authentic or true self? Second, under what conditions, if any, would a third 
party be warranted in intervening to encourage the mind-set that that third party 
thinks is more authentic? 
 When we discussed this type of case of shifting, confl icting mind-sets in our 
earlier article, we made a suggestion about how family members— and also the 
patients themselves—might go about deciding which mind-set is more represen-
tative of the patient’s true self. Our suggestion was that a mind-set in which the 
patient is inclined toward values that are widely endorsed and viewed as sensible 
or legitimate, even by those who do not share them, is,  ceteris paribus, a better can-
didate for being representative of the patient’s true self than an alternative mind-
set in which the patient is inclined toward values without that feature. Pugh, Maslen, 
and Savulescu reasonably request further explanation for why such mind-sets 
should be considered more representative of the person’s true self. We will address 
this question here. 
 The reason we offer has to do with what will be a main theme of the second half 
of these further refl ections having to do with the social roles that values play in 
our lives. However, we want to be very clear about the restricted nature of our 
claim on this topic. Our point that the shared status of some values can shed light 
on authenticity applies primarily to circumstances in which a patient experiences 
shifting mind-sets that prevent appeals to stable values to resolve authenticity 
questions. Furthermore, even in those cases, using information about more easily 
shared values to identify the more authentic mind-set does not necessarily pro-
vide either the patient or a third party with an overriding reason to think that this 
mind-set should be pursued. Manifesting a characteristic that one interprets as 
representative of one’s true self is a value, but there are other important values—
for example, the value of respecting a person’s personal autonomy—that also matter 
greatly. This point will be further developed later. 
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 Essentialism and Existentialism, Part 1: Internal Coherence and Synchronic 
versus Diachronic Self-Concepts 
 In our earlier article, we made the following six observations about the notion 
of the true self: (1) The concept permeates human thinking, and, therefore, will 
affect how stakeholders interpret the results of DBS. (2) The true self is a syn-
chronic notion that permits us to describe effects of DBS on the self, which the 
diachronic concept of personal identity does not. (3) The extent to which the true 
self is expressed can be a matter of degree. (4) The degree to which persons feel 
that their true self is expressed can be infl uenced by their modes of function-
ing, which can be affected by DBS. (5) In some cases, radical transformation 
can make the true self more fully expressed. (6) Which features are considered 
characteristic of a person’s true self depends, in an important sense, on which 
features that person values.  4  
 As Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu note, in focusing on these six points, there was 
an issue that we did not comment on in our discussion; namely, whether we had 
in mind an “essentialist” or “existentialist” conception of the true self. To address 
this question here, we should fi rst be clear about our aim. Our previous article 
addressed the true self as a concept that tends to concern ordinary people, includ-
ing patients, and which, therefore, is worth considering in DBS decisions. We did 
not directly engage with the question as to whether there is a true self that exists 
independent of peoples’ concept of it.  5  Consequently, our present interest in ques-
tions about essentialist and existentialist conceptions of the true self is primarily in 
whether people tend to conceptualize the true self in existentialist or essentialist 
ways, and whether there might be any practical benefi ts associated with either, 
or both of these ways, of conceptualizing the self. 
 Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu argue that our points (2) and (6) suggest an 
existentialist understanding of the notion of the true self. What does that mean? 
According to an  existentialist view of the true self, which characteristics are part of 
one’s true self is a matter of the choices people make and the agency they exercise. 
Thus understood, being one’s true self is a matter of “self-creation.” By contrast, 
an  essentialist interpretation of the true self sees it as a static set of characteristics to 
be discovered.  6  We did not set out to present an existentialist interpretation of how 
people think about the true self in our previous article. However, we do think that 
there are some ideas within existentialist philosophy that are useful in this overall 
discussion. In the next section, we briefl y discuss some such ideas; but here, our 
focus is on the discussion by Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu. 
 As they note, there is some reason to think that the folk concept of the true self 
is essentialist to a signifi cant extent, in the sense that people typically think of the 
characteristics that constitute the true self as “deeply inherent within the person.”  7  
This is consistent with a more general phenomenon of folk essentialism.  8  However, 
it is worth considering whether there are also existentialist aspects to ordinary 
peoples’ conception of the true self, in the sense that people view the true self 
as partially determined by the free choices and the agency of the human person. 
Very likely, most people have intuitions and beliefs about the true self that point 
in confl icting directions. 
 Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu prefer a combined view, “the dual-basis framework,” 
that understands being one’s true self in an authentic way to involve both discov-
ery and choice about who one wants to be.  9  We are in broad agreement with those 
AQ2
Sven Nyholm and Elizabeth O’Neill
4
authors here. Rather than viewing essentialism and existentialism as opposing 
interpretations of the true self, we fi nd it useful to view the true self as partially 
discovered, but also potentially something over which people have some control. 
Whether people manage to manifest what they take to be their true self surely 
depends on multiple factors, both in and outside of their control. We believe that 
it is possible to take this sort of view without abandoning the six points we made 
in our earlier article. 
 With regard to point (2) from our previous article in particular, Pugh, Maslen 
and Savulescu argue that there may be a tension between our claim that the true 
self is a synchronic notion and the task of determining which features of a person 
are aspects of their true self, which often entails considering enduring aspects of 
the self. Moreover, as they and also Alexandre Erler and Tony Hope point out, one 
reason patients are frequently concerned with the true self is that they are in 
pursuit of practical guidance.  10  Pugh, Maslen, and Savulexu suggest that our 
view may face a problem that Erler and Hope take existentialists to face: namely, 
failing to provide choice-independent guidance about which characteristics are 
more representative of the true self. We recognize this as an important concern, 
and will discuss it presently. First, we briefl y elaborate on our characterization of 
the true self as a synchronic notion. 
 Our discussion of synchronicity was motivated by the idea that patients’ con-
cerns about authenticity need not be solely rooted in a desire to maintain past 
characteristics. As an example, we mentioned that although it might be more in 
keeping with the past for a patient with severe OCD to continue having obsessions 
and compulsions, it might seem to that patient that his or her true self might be 
better realized if upon DBS treatment, the patient manages to fi nally get his or her 
obsessions and compulsions under control.  11  
 Part of our point about synchronicity was that at any given moment of assess-
ment, regardless of personal history or future, persons can always be thought of as 
exhibiting their true selves to some more or less fully realized degree. Moreover, 
 judgments about authenticity and the true self are also made at particular moments 
in time; and, such judgments about the characteristics that constitute an individual’s 
true self may change. Lastly, whether the mere persistence of a given characteristic 
over time makes it more likely to be counted as part of the true self ultimately 
depends on the particular conceptualization of the true self endorsed by whoever 
is making a judgment, and whether it is manifest.  12  
 Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu propose an alternative interpretation of the true 
self. They say that on this account, one can appeal to a person’s values over time 
to resolve questions about which characteristics are authentic. However, we are 
skeptical that this proposal offers benefi ts that a synchronic interpretation of the 
concept of the true self could not. So what is their account? They write, “the true 
self is best construed as being constituted by the cohering elements of the indi-
vidual’s nexus of values and their rational beliefs.”  13  In effect, these authors offer 
a procedural account of authenticity, according to which people can change their 
manifest characteristics authentically if this change is intelligible and justifi able in 
accordance their existing set of values and rational beliefs.  14  
 Such a coherence-based account implies, as the authors themselves note, that it 
is possible for a person to undergo radical transformational changes authentically, 
provided that it is coherence that supplies rational guidance for each change that 
the agent makes. This does place constraints on the possible ways that a person 
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can change at any given moment, since this depends on the person’s existing suite 
of values and beliefs, but it also means that in principle there are no essential, 
unchangeable aspects of one’s values, beliefs, and characteristics. As a consequence, 
in principle there are also no essential, unchangeable aspects of the true self. 
 This certainly strikes us as an interesting proposal. We agree that coherence can 
be important for understanding which values, beliefs, and characteristics are best 
counted as part of someone’s true self. Furthermore, we see that a coherence view 
of the true self can provide guidance also in cases in which a person counts a long-
standing, disvalued characteristic, such as OCD, as not being part of his or her 
true self. However, we think that the supposed diachronic nature of this account 
is unnecessary for obtaining this practical guidance. 
 The action guidance here is supplied solely by the procedural aim of obtaining 
coherence among one’s own values, beliefs, and characteristics, given a starting 
set of the same. Whether such features have endured or are quite new does not 
really matter for helping someone ascertain which of two possible features is more 
authentic in the sense of cohering with the person’s earlier positions. The person 
needs only to refer to his or her existing features, ascertain how coherence can be 
promoted, and then choose one of the actions that would promote coherence; for 
example, jettisoning an existing characteristic or adopting a new value. What 
matters for action guidance here is not continuity over time as such, but rather the 
more “logical” feature of coherence among the different states of mind that people 
can transition between. Therefore, we conclude that having a diachronic view of 
authenticity is not strictly required for action guidance. A purely synchronic version 
of Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu’s coherence account illustrates this. 
 That being said, we suspect that in most cases in which people feel that their 
conceptions of their true self have provided them with practical guidance, it is 
probably something more substantial and content related than coherence among 
their mental states that gave them this sense. Most likely, people who feel that they 
achieve guidance by a conception of their true self will typically fi nd that they are 
able to pinpoint some aspect of themselves with which they strongly associate or 
are moved by some value that they truly wish to live by. Many people do want to 
be “true to themselves,” and this can mean trying to be consistent; however, often-
times it is likely to mean something more substantial related to what they think they 
are like or what they aspire to be. 
 Essentialism and Existentialism, Part 2: The Neuroethics of Ambiguity 
 Taking a wider and more general perspective, and setting aside for the moment Pugh, 
Maslen, and Savulescu’s discussion, might it be helpful for patients to think of their 
true selves in a partly existentialist way? It is true that there are many real constraints 
on which characteristics people can actually manifest. On the other hand, people also 
have substantial control over which characteristics they exhibit. As far as making 
choices based on authenticity, agents may not obtain much practical guidance about 
how to be authentic if they think that the features that defi ne their true self are  com-
pletely up to them. However, we believe that it may promote both autonomy and well-
being if people believe that they have some choice and control over which of the 
characteristics that they do, or could, manifest are authentically their own. 
 This bring us to some basic ideas from the work of existentialist philoso-
phers Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir that we propose as being relevant. 
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Beginning with Sartre, the concept of “bad faith,” which he discusses in the sec-
ond chapter of his  Being and Nothingness , is important in this context.  15  Briefl y 
stated, this is the idea that if we believe that we have a very strongly fi xed essence 
and that all the norms and rules we think of ourselves as subject to are all absolute 
and non-fungible, then we are subject to a sort of self-deception: “bad faith.” 
We then fail to recognize a freedom that we possess as human beings to shape 
ourselves and our situation. We deceive ourselves—according to this idea of bad 
faith—if we think that human society and culture have to be exactly as they are 
and that we have an essence about which we can do nothing. 
 Also important from existentialist philosophy is what Simone de Beauvoir calls 
the “ethics of ambiguity:”  16  the idea that our human condition is deeply ambiguous 
in nature. On the one hand, we are constrained by biology and shaped by society 
and culture, but on the other, we also possess freedom to shape ourselves and to 
transcend constraints and boundaries imposed on us from both the inside and 
the outside. According to de Beauvoir, we need, as human beings, to accept this 
unavoidable ambiguity as being part of the human condition. To be “honest” 
with ourselves, to live in an “authentic” way, any sensible person, according to her 
analysis, needs to accept and embrace this ambiguity. These ideas from Sartre and 
de Beauvoir underscore the point that there may be value in conceptualizing 
authenticity and true self as partly under one’s own control. 
 DBS raises questions about authenticity in part because it can seemingly con-
fer on the patient and the medical team an ability to alter what the patient can be 
and do. In effect, it also has the potential to change how the patient views his or 
her true self, and what values, beliefs, and characteristics that patient views as 
authentic. This is suggested by Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu’s earlier discussions 
of DBS as a treatment for AN. In our opinion, technology—including advanced 
medical technologies like DBS—has the potential to widen and deepen the free-
dom people have to shape ourselves and to take control of who and what we are 
as human beings and as individuals.  17  Technology can affect which features we 
are capable of exhibiting, the centrality and role of particular characteristics in 
relation to other characteristics, and how we view those characteristics. When 
such freedom-enhancing technologies are under human control, there is further 
reason for including existentialist elements in our philosophical interpretations 
of what it is for a person—a DBS patient or any other person—to realize what 
that person regards as his or her true self. 
 Notably, some bioconservatives worry about precisely this aspect of tech-
nologies that can be used for self-shaping. Bioconservatives are theorists who 
oppose the use of modern technology to manipulate or “enhance” human 
beings. Michael Sandel, for example, worries that if human beings go too far in 
shaping themselves using biomedical and other kinds of technologies, we will 
be left in a situation where we have control over almost all aspects of our own 
nature. In such a situation, there is “nothing to affi rm or behold outside our own 
will.”  18  It is better, Sandel thinks, to leave certain aspects of our own nature 
untouched. We should accept these aspects of ourselves as simply “given,” and 
not created by human agency. 
 Whether or not Sandel intends his discussion in that way, his argument suggests 
that he too endorses—if only implicitly—something similar to what de Beauvoir 
calls the “ethics of ambiguity”: that human life is a mix of things that we have to 
accept as given as well as things that we can infl uence or control. Sandel may fi nd 
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it alarming that neurotechnologies such as DBS have the potential to shift the 
balance among the different aspects of our ambiguous human existence; how-
ever, to the extent that such shifts can help to promote patients’ autonomy and 
well-being, we think that the technological developments that produce them 
should potentially be welcomed. 
 To summarize the main points of this section: the way we are, including how we 
perceive our “true selves,” depends on multiple factors, which encompass every-
thing from biology to society/culture to the choices we make and the agency we 
exercise. It would be a form of “bad faith” to deny our freedom to infl uence and 
shape ourselves and our human situation; however, human existence is “ambigu-
ous” at its core: we have to accept some aspects of ourselves, whereas other aspects 
are under our control. As a result, we suspect that there is practical value in con-
ceptualizing the true self as having both existentialist and essentialist components. 
However, the relationship between what is simply “given” and what we can infl u-
ence is not static. New and developing technologies—including medical technolo-
gies such as DBS—shift the boundaries and constraints of the human condition. 
This adds an additional level of complexity to the question of authenticity. 
 Authenticity and the Case of the AN Patient with Confl icting, Shifting Mind-Sets 
 As mentioned, in our earlier article we discussed a topic that Pugh, Maslen, and 
Savulescu had also discussed in their previous work on DBS and authenticity; 
namely, the possibility of using DBS to treat AN. One important issue in their dis-
cussion, which we also picked up in ours, was that AN patients may shift between 
different mind-sets, where the values they endorse in one mind-set appear differ-
ent from the values they endorse in another mind-set. Tony Hope et al. report that 
they sometimes fi nd this situation in their clinical work with AN patients.  19  The 
question here was whether there is a particular mind-set in which an AN patient 
can be said to better be able to manifest her true self. 
 Patients may sometimes enter into a mind-set in which they view AN as a prob-
lem for which they need help. But the same patient may then shift to an alternative 
mind-set in which her values seem to change, and in which she values extremely 
thinness more than anything else. Drawing on Jacinta Tan and colleagues’ discus-
sion of what they call “pathological values,” we made a suggestion about how 
patients and their families might think about this circumstance.  20  Tan et al. suggest 
that the sorts of values a patient exhibits in the latter sort of mind-set are so closely 
tied in with the patient’s illness that they can be regarded as “pathological,” and, 
for that reason, less authentic than values not associated with the patient’s AN. 
Our suggestion was somewhat different. 
 If the patient and the patient’s family want to assess which mind-set best repre-
sents the patient’s true self, we proposed that one consideration that could guide 
such assessments is whether the values of one mind-set (and not the other) are 
viewed as sensible or legitimate even by those who do not hold them. In other 
words, these are values about which people think there can be reasonable discus-
sions and disagreements. In such a case, we suggested that the patient and the 
family might have reason to think that the mind-set featuring values with that 
particular feature is more authentic than the mind-set featuring values without 
it.  21  We can label the values that are viewed as sensible or legitimate even by those 
who do not hold them “tolerable values.” 
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 Patients with AN who experience shifting mind-sets sometimes have values 
in one mind-set that fall squarely outside of the range of what their family and 
others with whom they interact consider tolerable. For example, Tan et al. note 
that AN patients sometimes start valuing achieving extreme thinness as the 
highest value in life, including their own safety. According to our suggestion, 
if an AN patient shifts between such a mind-set and one where he or she places 
a more typical degree of value on thinness, that patient and the patient’s family 
would have reason to regard the mind-set in which thinness is valued over 
health—even at the cost of death—as being less representative of the patient’s 
true self. As noted by Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu, this idea has some appeal 
inasmuch as it supplies guidance about authenticity; however, in our earlier 
work we did not elaborate on the reasons substantiating this suggestion. In the 
next section we offer more in defense of our proposal by turning to another topic 
discussed at some length by Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu; namely, the question 
of what it is to value something. 
 First we will very briefl y return to their suggestion that self-discovery is 
achieved through the creation of coherence among one’s different mental states 
and attitudes. The just-described AN-patient could become more coherent overall 
by remaining in the mind-set that Tan et al. call “pathological”: the mind-set in 
which they have the sort of unhealthy values and attitudes some AN patients are 
drawn to. But the patient could also become more coherent by trying to remain in 
the mind-set in which their values are more “tolerable” for others and “healthy.” 
Therefore, the idea that we achieve authenticity by being more coherent seems to 
offer no clear reason why it might make sense to view a more tolerable and healthy 
mind-set as more authentic than a mind-set that strikes many people as pathological. 
This is another important reason why we think, as mentioned, that it makes sense 
to look for more substantial and value-based reasons for making judgments about 
when a patient manages to best manifest his or her true self. 
 Valuing and the Social Role of Values 
 According to Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu, to better understand the way in 
which people’s values relate to what it is for them to manifest their true selves, 
we need to refl ect on what is involved in valuing something. As these authors 
point out, we had little to say about the nature of valuing in our previous article. 
Here, we want to emphasize the importance of the role that values play in social 
interactions. In our view, the social role of values has practical implications for 
authenticity. In particular, we believe that it has implications for the sort of case 
described previously, in which patients have shifting mind-sets, and the values 
they incline toward in some mind-sets are more “tolerable” than those that they 
incline towards in others. 
 Importantly, it is the case that people often seek to associate with others who 
share their values. Shared values help to organize and structure peoples’ interper-
sonal interactions, which in turn infl uence their future actions, beliefs, values, and 
manifested characteristics. In short, human beings characteristically associate, unite, 
or commune with others on the basis of shared values. 
 Notably, this phenomenon plays an important role in infl uential accounts of 
how human morality originated historically. Several theories of the evolution 
of morality posit that it was a need to cooperate that provided the conditions in 
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which humans acquired capacities for morality.  22  Interactions with others are 
made possible by shared values governing how such interactions should proceed. 
For example, cooperation generally requires agreement on shared goals and shared 
expectations about how individuals are to behave in important situations.  23  One 
explanation for how humans came to evolve a capacity for values, particularly 
moral values, rather than merely desires, is that such values and other components 
of moral psychology played an integral role in supplying both the motivation to 
comply with norms and the ability to signal reliability as a potential partner.  24  
 Setting aside the more distant origins of human valuing, the importance of 
shared values in amicable social interactions is an apparent aspect of everyday 
life. Friends and romantic partners tend to share basic values, and often these 
shared values can be thought of as part of the basis of their relationships. In 
contrast, disagreement about values, especially values that an agent considers 
moral, can incline people to distance themselves from those with whom they 
disagree.  25  This is not a new observation – Cicero, for example, argued that what 
draws potential friends together is the perception of good qualities in each other. 
A lasting friendship, Cicero argues, is based on “mutual goodwill and affection” 
along with “agreement in all things, both human and divine;” that is, the sharing 
of values.  26  Moreover, less personal relationships can also be based on shared 
values and interests in a similar way. Notably, this can be so even when the values 
in question may strike some as rather self-centered, such as those related to 
“self-tracking” technologies. Social scientists studying the so-called “quantifi ed 
self” movement have noticed that people who track and monitor themselves 
and their own health using self-tracking technologies are often motivated to 
seek out others with similar interests, both online and offl ine, such as at confer-
ences and other social meetups.  27  
 Therefore, whether in close personal relationships, or in ones that are less close, 
shared values help to bring people together and sustain their relationships. With 
that observation in place, we return now to the issue of patients with shifting mind-
sets. Recall that our proposal is that if patients (e.g., AN patients) are unstable in 
their mind-sets in a particular way, they and their families have reason to regard the 
mind-sets in which they share values as being more representative of their true 
selves. We propose that the just-described social role that values play supplies a 
reason for patients and their families to regard such a mind-set in that way; specifi -
cally, that this mind-set is more likely to enable well-functioning relationships. If a 
medical technology such as DBS can help a patient to remain in a mind-set in which 
that person shares important values with the other people in his or her life, then DBS 
will also help support the patient’s mutual relationships.  28  
 To make this more concrete, consider an unstable AN patient who sometimes 
enters into a mind-set in which she values extreme thinness more than her own 
safety, and in which anyone whom she perceives as “fat” will be viewed as unwor-
thy. When the patient enters into such a mind-set, her family is likely to feel alien-
ated, just as the patient is likely to also feel alienated from the family, given their 
very different mind-sets. In contrast, when the patient shifts toward a mind-set in 
which she distances herself from these ideas about extreme thinness, it is likely to 
be much easier for the patient and the family to come together on the basis of 
shared values. Hence for the sake of their relationship, there is reason for the AN 
patient and the patient’s family to see the latter mind-set as being more represen-
tative of the patient’s true self. 
AQ3
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 Valuing Wholeheartedly, and Individuality 
 However, as mentioned, the problem of shifting mind-sets raises not just one, 
but at least two diffi cult questions. First, there is the question just discussed 
about determining which mind-set is to be considered more authentic. But there is 
also a second, more practical question, determining under what conditions a 
third party would be warranted in actively encouraging a patient to pursue the 
mind-set that the third party believes is more authentic. This issue is briefl y 
considered next. 
 Even if one takes the idea of a person’s “true self” to be very important—indeed, 
important enough for us to refl ect on what principles ought to guide judgments 
about people’s true selves—the value of manifesting what is considered a person’s 
true self is certainly not the only value that matters in healthcare or other contexts. 
Values such as whether something is a medical benefi t or if it respects personal 
autonomy, also need to be taken into account.  29  Whether a person is able to man-
ifest what we, or that person, consider to be that person’s true self is not the be-all 
and end-all of treatment decisions when considering whether or not to use a tech-
nology such as DBS to treat a certain condition. Even in circumstances in which we 
think that it can make sense to ask which of shifting mind-sets best represents a 
person’s true self, and even if there can be good reasons for making judgments 
about this issue in certain ways, we do not believe that this value should take pri-
ority over other values in treatment decisions. Although this is an issue of concern 
to many people, it is also important to underscore that this is not the only value 
that matters in these contexts, and a determination of which mind-set is more 
authentic need not determine the conclusion about which mind-set should be 
chosen. 
 In addition, when a third party advocates for one mind-set over another, there 
is a risk of threatening the patient’s perception of his or her own authenticity. 
Although we have emphasized the importance of shared values for relationships, 
and proposed that they can be a contributor to one’s sense of authenticity, people 
often react poorly if they feel that values are being imposed on them by others. 
If people are to feel that they are being their own true selves authentically, 
as they live in accordance with certain values, they need to be given room to 
form their own ideas and conceptions of what it is for them to live by these 
values in a way with which they are comfortable. 
 Therefore, even if families and patients are able to agree that a mind-set in which 
the patient’s values are closer to the family’s is more representative of the patient’s 
true self, families nevertheless need to avoid imposing upon the patient overly 
restrictive ideas about what these values imply about how the patient should live 
his or her life. Just as not being able to share values can be alienating, so too can 
having to live by somebody else’s conception of those values. Pugh, Maslen, and 
Savulescu note that John Stuart Mill was surely right in maintaining that many 
people value developing their own individuality. 
 What makes it possible for people who are different in certain ways to share 
values is that, in practice, many values come both in a more general form, allow-
ing different people to share them, and in more fully specifi ed forms, which are 
the ways people interpret them within the context of their lives. In order to take on 
some common human value and make it our own, we typically need to form our 
own conception of what it means to live by that value within the specifi c context 
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of our individual life. This is how values can be put into more concrete practice 
within a person’s life: general ideals need to be interpreted, specifi ed, and applied 
to specifi c conditions before individuals can live by them. 
 How does this relate to authenticity, and to what persons will associate with 
their true self? An important implication is that for people to feel that they are 
authentically being their “true selves” when acting in accordance with some value 
shared by others, they will most likely need to have a conception of what this 
value means to them and how it fi ts with their personal situation. When we inter-
pret the degree to which other people are being “their true self,” we are likely to do 
so using our own ideas about how to live by certain values.  30  But for these others 
to feel that they are being their true selves in acting in accordance with some value, 
it needs to be one that they endorse and with which they agree. Only then are they 
likely to feel that their adherence to the value is truly “authentic.” 
 Concluding Summary 
 To summarize these further refl ections, we have noted that our earlier article did 
not take a position on whether we should accept an essentialist or an existentialist 
understanding of the true self. At that time, we were more focused on ordinary 
people’s tendency to postulate a true self than on whether or not there really is 
such a thing as a true self. However, we agree with Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu 
that it makes good sense to discuss this distinction between essentialism and exis-
tentialism as a way of deepening the analysis of “authenticity” and the “true self” 
as concepts that concern people in relation to interventions such as DBS. Also, 
as we argued, we also believe that there are interesting ideas in the existentialist 
literature and other related sources that are relevant in this neuroethical context. 
 Just as Simone de Beauvoir argues that the human condition is marked by a 
deep “ambiguity,” neuroethical discussions of DBS’s impact on the self should be 
attentive to the fact that multiple and potentially contradictory factors typically 
conspire to infl uence what patients and their families perceive as most representa-
tive of the patient’s true self. And as technologies such as DBS and similar medical 
technologies become more advanced, it would also be what existentialists call 
“bad faith” to think that human beings have a fi xed essence that cannot be altered, 
even if we should also recognize that there still are many factors in a person’s life 
that are outside of their control. 
 We also agree with Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu that the analysis of DBS 
and authenticity can be deepened by paying close attention to what is typically 
involved in having values that we try to live by. Whereas these authors mainly 
focus on how values can be integrated into an overall coherent psychology, our 
focus here was on two slightly different components: fi rst, the social role of values 
within human life; and, second, the crucial need for people to develop their own 
understandings of what it means for them to live by the values that they endorse 
within their particular personal situation. 
 By refl ecting on these aspects, we will have a better understanding of what sorts 
of arguments might be brought to bear on cases in which patients shift between dif-
ferent mind-sets. Some of these mind-sets endorse values that can be easily shared 
with other people; whereas other mind-sets endorse harder to share values. 
The social role of values supports viewing more “tolerable” mind-sets as the mind-
sets that patients and their families have reason to see as best expressing the patient’s 
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true self. However, like other people, patients need to be given space to formulate 
their own view on how these values relate to their lives. Only then, can patients 
truly make these values their own, and only in living in accordance with these 
values are they most likely to feel that their true self is authentically manifested. 
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